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APPELLATE

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
NATURE QF CASE
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and with
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington
1

County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding.
The trial was by jury.

The defendant appeals the judgment of the

Court and specifically the Court's determination at the time of
sentencing, enhancing the minimum term of imprisonment of the
defendant pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1.

The

defendant argues that any factual determinations which affect the
defendant's substantive rights should be determined by the jury.
The Court committed error in enhancing the defendant's sentence
and improperly sentenced the defendant under said statute.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Is the defendant entitled to have the jury determine the
factual issue of involvement of two or more people for the purpose of
enhancing his sentence?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.

Utah

appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error
standard with no deference to the trial court.

Ward v. Richfield City.

798 P2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); State v. Larsen. 865 P2d 1355, 1357
(Utah 1992); State v. Vigil. 842 P2d 843, 844, (Utah 1992); State v.
Mitchell. 824 P2d 469, 471-472, (Utah App. 1991).
Utah Appellate Courts review questions of fact giving great
deference to the trier of fact.

Findings of fact are reviewed under a

clearly erroneous standard; they will not be set aside unless they are
against the clear weight of the evidence or if the appellate court
2

comes to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
State v. Walker. 743 P2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Murphv. 872
P2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Chavez. 840 P2d 846, 848
(Utah App. 1992).
The issues were preserved in the trial court, by defense
objection on the record. (T. 303 and 318 and Sentencing Transcripts).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP KULES
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the body of this
brief and includes the pertinent portions of Utah Code Annotated
§76-3-203.1; Article 1 §10 of the Utah Constitution; and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged in a criminal information with
Count I, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,
a second degree felony, and Count II, arranging to distribute a
controlled substance, a second degree felony.

The charging

information alleged that on or about December 30, 1994, to January
1, 1995, the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed
methamphetamine with intent to distribute the same, and did agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute it in violation of Utah Code.
The State alleged that the defendant arranged to pick up a controlled
substance in California for distribution in Utah and made
arrangements with local individuals to fund a portion of his trip in
exchange for a portion of the drugs.
3

The state also alleged that the

offense was done in concert with two or more individuals, thus the
defendant was subject to an enhanced minimum sentence, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1.
4, 1995.

A jury trial was held on May

After presentation of the evidence, the jury found the

defendant guilty of Counts I and II.
The information alleged that the defendant committed Count II
in concert with two or more individuals for purposes of enhancing
his sentence, however, no question was put to the jury concerning
that factual allegation.

At the time of sentencing held on June 7,

1995, and re-sentencing on November 20, 1996, defendant objected
to the Court finding facts that the defendant committed Count II in
concert with two or more individuals.

The Court overruled said

objections and sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum
term of six years pursuant to said statute.

The defendant's

objections and the Court's ruling are found in the transcript of both
sentencing hearings, found with the original record.
There were major inconsistencies and wide variations in the
testimony of the State's primary witnesses, Robert Larsen and Mary
Nevarez.

This was reiterated at the time of sentencing by Judge

Shumate wherein he states, 'With respect to Robert Larsen, I frankly
agree with the statements of your own counsel.
credible witness.

Mr. Larsen was not a

I was impressed by him only to the extent that he

did not seem to be able to find the truth in what he had to say.'
4

(Sentencing Transcript, 13).
sentencing hearing.

It was reiterated at the second

See November 6, 1996 sentencing Transcript, 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

At the time of sentencing, the trial court read Utah Code
Annotated §76-3-203.1 and held that it was up to the trial judge,
and not the jury, to enter findings of fact concerning defendant's
conduct being in concert with two or more individuals for purposes
of enhancing his penalty to a minimum six year term in the Utah
State Prison.

Under the United States and Utah Constitutions, a

criminal defendant is entitled to have the facts determined by a jury.
The statutory element of a defendant being in concert with two or
more individuals is factual in nature regardless of what the
legislature intends to call it.

Additionally, even though the sentence

is within the indeterminate sentence provided for a second degree
felony, it is for a minimum term of six years, rather than the
minimum term of one year for a regular second degree felony.

The

defendant is entitled to have the jury specifically find those facts,
and not the trial judge.

The issues left to the Judge should be the

sentencing itself, not factual determinations which lead to enhanced
penalties.
The Court's finding that defendant engaged in conduct with
Melanie Timmons was plain error.

The evidence does not support

such a conclusion, even when read in a light most favorable to the
trial judge.
5

The defendant's conviction should be set aside as the Court
committed error in making factual determinations that should be
rightfully left to the jury.

Additionally, the evidence was not

sufficient to sustain the enhanced penalty.
ARGUMENT
Point
determine
two
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The defendant was sentenced under the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated §76-3-203.1.

The pertinent provisions of the statute

read as follows:
76-3-203.1.
Offenses committed by three or more
persons -- Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons is
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided
below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this
section means the defendant and two or more other
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as
parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an
indictment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon
the complaint in misdemeanor cases or the information or
indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this
section. The notice shall be in a clause separate from and
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court
may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the
charging document to include the subscription if the court

finds the charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or
more persons, or if the court finds the defendant has not
otherwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under
this section are:
* * *

(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted
person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term
of six years in prison.
* * *

(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b,
or 37c, regarding drug-related offenses;
* * *

(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense
but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified,
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or
lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide
whether to impose the enhanced penalty under this
section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a
finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability
of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of
the sentence required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served;
and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the
disposition on the record and in writing.

7

The trial court made a determination that the legislature
specifically authorized and allowed the trial judge, and not the jury,
to make the factual determination, regarding a defendant's
involvement with two or more persons, for the purpose of enhancing
his penalty to a minimum six year term under the present case.

The

defendant in this particular case attacks the trial court's
determination.
The defendant is entitled to have a jury determine all factual
issues, under both the State and Federal Constitutions guaranteeing
the defendant a right to a trial by jury.

The Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides:
AMENDMENT VI [Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except
in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous.
In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
8

verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded.
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also mandates
the defendants right to a jury trial.

In Mel Hardman

Productions.

Inc. v. Robinson. 604 P2d 913 (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court stated:
As we have numerous times indicated, the right of
trial by jury is one which should be carefully safeguarded
by the courts, and when a party had demanded such a
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings
on issues of fact; and it is not the trial court's prerogative
to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own.
Id. at 917.
Even though a civil case, this rule should be equally applicable
to criminal jury matters.
The factual finding that the defendant engaged in criminal
conduct in concert with two or more people provides the Court with
an opportunity to sentence the defendant to a minimum six year
term in the Utah State Prison for the second degree felony.
While it is true that the six year term is within the
indeterminate term of a second degree felony under Utah Statute, it
does substantially deprive the defendant of rights he has in the
criminal justice system.

When convicted of a second degree felony,

the indeterminate term of sentence is one to 15 years in the Utah
State Prison.

The defendant may be entitled to be paroled after one

year on such a conviction.

However, in the present situation, the trial

judge himself was allowed to make a factual determination which in
9

reality increased the defendant's minimum term to six years in
prison.

As a result of the trial judge's factual determination, the

defendant loses any possible right of parole in years 2 through 5.

It

is not possible at the time of sentencing to determine whether the
defendant would have been paroled in years 2, 3, 4 or 5, however,
that right was absolutely taken away from him because of a trial
judge's factual determination.

Under the guarantees of the Utah law

and the Utah and United States Constitution, entitling the defendant
to a trial by jury, such factual determination should have been made
by that jury, as it resulted in the defendant losing substantial rights.
The Court's finding that the defendant acted in concert with
Melanie Timmons is inadequate and clearly against the weight of the
evidence.

It is interesting to note that the trial judge specifically

found that Robert Larsen was too disbelievable to rely upon for the
purpose of finding that the defendant acted in concert with him.
This point of argument thus outlines the evidence as it applies to
Melanie Timmons.

The evidence adduced at trial would seemingly

show the following facts and circumstances.

Mary Nevarez testified

that the defendant told her that he had arranged to meet Melanie
Timmons in Mesquite, Nevada, for the last leg of the journey home.
(T. 176).

I believe it is undisputed that Melanie Timmons did ride

with her boyfriend, Mary Nevarez and the defendant, from Mesquite,
Nevada, to St. George, Utah, on the night in question.

Yet, Mary

Nevarez also testified that she did not know if Melanie Timmons ever
10

saw the drugs brought from the car into her house.

(T. 208).

Nor did

she recall if Melanie was present when the defendant allegedly
handed her the green bindle of methamphetamine.

(T. 210).

She

testified that she gave Mr. Larsen the methamphetamine upstairs in
his bedroom, which would have been out of the eye-sight of Melanie
Timmons.

(T. 211).

The only connection that Melanie Timmons was

involved is the one statement of Mary Nevarez that Art had told her
that she was going to be involved.

There was disputed evidence that

Ms. Timmons used drugs with the defendant and Ms. Nevarez in Ms.
Timmons1 home on their arrival from Mesquite, and also that she
used drugs that morning in the Larsen home.

However, the record

provides no evidence that she was aware of where the drugs came
from or of the alleged overall plan.

From Ms. Nevarez1 testimony,

there was no discussion of the drugs on the way to St. George, it is
doubtful that Melanie Timmons saw any drugs being transported
from the car into the house, and it was not possible for Melanie
Timmons to have even seen the drugs being given to Mr. Larsen.
This is the evidence marshaled in favor of the court's ruling.

Such

evidence is clearly too insubstantial to conclude that Melanie
Timmons acted in concert with the defendant in this alleged drug
deal.
It is additionally shown, however, that both the defendant and
Ms. Timmons testified that she was not involved with the defendant
in relation to a drug transaction.

Ms. Timmons testified that she had
11

voluntarily gone to Mesquite with a friend and ran into Art in
Mesquite on the morning of New Year's.

(T. 258).

Therein, she also

specifically stated that she had not talked to Art about meeting him
on that occasion.

She testified that on the way to St. George they did

not have any discussion concerning drugs.

(T. 260-261).

This would

seemingly substantiate the testimony of Mary Nevarez and would
additionally seemingly not implicate Melanie Timmons in this
transaction.

The defendant thereafter testified that he simply ran

into Melanie at the Casino in Mesquite, and offered her a ride home
because her car was broken down.

(T. 288).

The court made a mistake and from the evidence it was clearly
erroneous.

With all the evidence marshaled in favor of the court,

such ruling is still wrong and should be set aside.

See State v.

M u r p h v . 872 P2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Walker. 743
P2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); and State v. Chavez. 840 P2d 846, 848
(Utah App. 1992).
Even if the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the
trial judge's ruling, it is clearly inadequate to implicate Melanie
Timmons in a common scheme with the defendant, and was an
erroneous finding by the trial court.
The trial court committed error in sentencing the defendant to
a minimum term of six years under the statute, and his sentence
should be reversed on that basis.
12

CONCLUSION
The defendant's sentence to a minimum term of six years must
be set aside and reversed.

The defendant has a constitutional right

to have factual issues which will lead to a deprivation of his rights
heard by a jury.

The legislature cannot take away those

constitutional rights.

Likewise, the court's findings are not supported

by the testimony, and therefore the minimum six year term must be
set aside.
DATED this 14th day of April, 1997.

^slst^sy^
.aMar J Wmward
Attorney for defendant/appellant
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